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ABSTRACT
This work investigates the role and contribution of external auditing as practised in the 
Malaysian society during the forty year period from independence in 1957 to just before the 
onset of the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997.  It applies the political economic theory introduced 
by Tinker (1980) and refined by Cooper & Sherer (1984), which emphasises the social 
relations aspects of professional activity rather than economic forces alone. In a case study 
format where qualitative data was gathered mainly from primary and secondary source 
materials, the study  found that the function of auditing in the Malaysian society in most cases 
is devoid of any essence of mission; instead it is created, shaped and changed by the pressures 
which give rise to its development over time. The largely insignificant role that it serves is 
intertwined within the contexts in which it operates. 
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The activity of external auditing as conducted by audit firms  intervenes between the 
preparation of financial and non-financial information relating to a particular entity by 
management and the (supposed) use by many different groups of users of this audited 
information. In Malaysia, this audit is characterised by little publicity and little public clamour 
for needed changes.  There may be a few lone voices from both the public and private sectors 
asking  auditors and their representative bodies, the Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA) 
and the Malaysian Association of Certified Public Accountants (MACPA) to do a better job, 
but that seems to be where the "story" ends.
2 From time to time there would also be certain 
exposures/revelations’ which provide proof that external audit in the country is in need of a 
certain level of revamp.  
Examples include the revelation made by the Central Bank of Malaysia that the 
main issues of contention between the Central Bank and the external auditor were a 
consequence of the auditor having compromised his or her independence  in two proven areas 
of financial reporting: disclosure and the provisional figure for bad and doubtful accounts 
(Central Bank, 1987, p. 6).  On the former issue in particular, there had been cases where the 
auditor either worked together with management or agreed with management efforts at 
"window-dressing" the accounts leading to inadequate disclosure of significant changes in 
accounting policy and/or unneeded adjustments  to certain disclosed items .  A few years later 
in 1991, it was an auditor himself, Mr. Khoo Eng Choo, a senior partner of  Price Waterhouse, 
who mentioned that there were local auditors who "...  have been found not to have exercised 
sound professional judgement" (Choo, 1991, p. 23).  He also made the following revelation (p. 
23): “It is also unfortunate that sometimes some members of the profession have sunk to the 
level of enabling some unscrupulous members of the business community to dictate to them 
the approach 'Just your signature' is enough.   They become poodles or lapdogs of these 
businessmen.  These members are tarnishing the image of the profession and have failed in 
their duties.”  
But even with these revelations, the one single case/only incident where a 
Malaysian auditor has been brought to court took place in the mid-1960s when a group of 
company shareholders unhappy with the losses they had incurred, sued the auditor.
3 Thus, 
during economic recessions in the 1980s, when many businesses were forced to close down 
and cases of financial improprieties by directors and top management were disclosed, 
Malaysian auditors avoided being taken to court.  In this regard, the then finance minister 
Datuk Paduka (now Tun) Daim Zainuddin was quoted by the New Straits Times
4 (12 Sept. 
1987) as saying that "... it is a miracle that no member of the public or any interested party has 
sued auditors for being professionally negligent taking into account the various "swindle" 
cases recently ...."   The blissful existence of Malaysian auditors certainly contrasts   that 
experienced by teachers/lecturers, government servants, politicians, Malay rulers, nurses who 
      
3have all by the early 1990s entered the limelight of adverse publicity. Other professionals, such 
as physicians and lawyers have also in recent years, been confronted with adverse public 
scrutiny.
5 
Indeed, if there is any profession or group of people in the country which seems 
to have been able to operate with little challenge to its practices, it is the so-called company 
auditors. This in fact had led Oh Chong Peng, the then vice-president of the MACPA and also 
a senior partner of Malaysia's Coopers and Lybrand, to argue that there was still not enough 
pressure coming from the Malaysian society in order for the auditor to extend his or her 
responsibilities -  despite the recent numerous cases of failures of companies, both listed and 
unlisted, where  auditors had failed to give warning by qualifying in their audit reports that 
such companies were not going-concerns (Peng, 1989). Thus, he pointed out, there was little 
need for the accounting profession to put forward reactive measures. Similar sentiments may 
also be found in the remarks made by his colleague, the then MACPA president, Subimal Sen 
Gupta (The Malaysian Accountant, July 1987, p. 4).  The latter figure had also pointed out that 
even the regulatory authorities were oblivious to the on-goings (more appropriate)/goings-on 
in audit.
6
What is happening in Malaysia is considerably different from that experienced 
by auditors in countries such as the United States, Britain, Canada and Australia.  In these 
countries, they are often criticised for  business failures and a number have had to pay large 
damages or settle out of court with plaintiffs accusing them of committing audit failures. 
Besides the court, regulatory agencies and other groups have also played their part in 
demanding that the profession move in an expeditious fashion to meet its responsibilities as 
perceived by the public (see Flint, 1983; Bruce, 1988; Humphrey et al., 1992; and Jacob, 
1992). In these countries, even where external economic factors force businesses into 
liquidation and there is little proof of auditors' failure to conduct audits properly, the auditors 
have nonetheless become implicated in the failure. 
 Malaysia's auditing experience when compared to other Asian countries such as 
South Korea, Hong Kong, India and Singapore ,  is a source of surprise.  This is because unlike 
what has happened in Malaysia,  auditors in these countries have experienced tough times with 
their authorities.
7  In the case of South Korea and Singapore, the auditors concerned have also 
been brought to court by  disgruntled investors.
8
This paper thus attempts to explain this Malaysian audit phenomenon by 
applying the alternative contextual view of accounting i.e. the theory of political economy, 
with the theory of political economy introduced by Tinker (1980) and refined for accounting 
by Coopers and Sherer (1984). Attempts are made to understand how the distribution of power 
in the society and the social, political and institutional structures that mirror that distribution of 
power have impacted the functioning of audit in Malaysia across a period of forty years, from 
the gaining of independence from the British in August 1957 to the time just before the 
emergence of the Asian Financial Crisis in the third quarter of 1997.  In other words, auditing 
is understood here to be interrelated with the dynamics of the wider sociopolitical and 
economic context of which it is an integral part.  It is considered to be a mutable phenomenon, 
interacting with a dynamic, mutable context (Hopwood, 1987). By examining the social, 
economic and political environments surrounding auditing together with developments within 
auditing itself, it is hoped that the original, present and potential functions of auditing in 
      
4Malaysia will be disclosed fairly - perhaps in the spirit of the following remark by Burchell et 
al. (1980, p.13): "... accounting, it would appear, is made to be purposive rather than being 
inherently purposeful." 
While this is a country-specific study, it also provides a contribution within the 
framework of international comparative auditing research (professionalisation or professional 
developments) by adding to studies of the causes and effects of auditing variation between 
countries classified under the typology of fast developing economies.   Another form of 
contribution of this work is concerned with the issue raised by Willmott (1991, p. 109): that 
the study of auditing "has been seriously neglected and marginalised, even as evidence of 
‘failures’ mounts and doubts about the independence of auditors grow".  It is thus hoped that 
this paper will be able to contribute in some way towards enriching this very important area. 
Finally, by carrying out this research, it is specifically hoped that the profile of auditing will be 
raised in Malaysia to direct the attention of more influential parties (e.g. politicians, civil 
servants, journalists, consumer groups) to  probing questions about the operation and adequacy 
of  existing audit regulatory arrangements (Sikka et al., 1989; Willmott, 1985) with  focus also 
directed to other areas related to the audit practice.
The paper begins with a discussion of the theory of the political economy of 
accounting.  It is then followed by a section on data collection.  A section describing the on-
goings/goings-on in the audit arena and related areas follows right after. This section is divided 
into three parts: the early beginnings, the NEP era and the post-NEP era of 1987-1997.  In 
attempting to make sense of what has taken place, the subsequent section applies the theory of 
the political economy of accounting to that section where the discussion is imparted into two 
parts:   the pre-NEP era and the NEP plus era. The paper then ends with a section on 
conclusions. 
The Political Economy of Accounting
The political economic theory was introduced by Tinker (1980) and refined by Cooper and 
Sherer (1984) to explain accounting experiences. Tinker (1980) in introducing a classical 
political economic approach to financial reporting, proposes that the social relations of 
production work together with the economic forces of production as two related dimensions of 
capital shaping the social and economic life of a nation.  He points out that in any society, the 
coming together of the two modes of production is discernible in the particular socio-political 
and economic institutional forms and arrangements. The use of political economic theory that 
recognises the presence of social relations makes it less cumbersome to understand the 
economic forces of production that are operating at any particular time period and in any 
society.  Tinker explains that such relations are reflected through a set of institutional forms 
and arrangements that are constructed to interact with economic relations (i.e. the type of 
economy).  
Therefore, in order to understand what is going on in the economic sphere, 
which may include the external audit function, researchers need to identify the related socio-
economic and institutional environments. Interpretation of a nation's specific economic 
features will be less clearer if insufficient attention is given to the surrounding social and 
political processes. In regard to accounting activity in particular, Cooper and Sherer (1984) 
point out that a political economy of accounting is useful in order to understand how the 
      
5accounting process interacts with its social, economic and political environment. They write as 
follows (p.208):
... the objectives of and for accounting are fundamentally contested, arise out of recognition 
that any form of accounting contains   representation of a specific social and political 
context.   Not only is accounting policy essentially political in that it derives from the 
political struggle in society as a whole but also the outcomes of accounting policy are 
essentially political in that they operate for the benefit of some groups in society and to the 
detriment of others.
Thus, it is assumed that  no basic harmony of interests exist in the current society.  Auditing 
practice is viewed as favouring specific dominant interests in the society and disadvantaging 
others. That is, what transpires in the audit process would be in accord with the expectations or 
goals of these dominant parties.  Cooper and Sherer (1984) have also identified the presence of 
several key variables which they claim affect the value of financial accounting reports 
including power-play in society and historical specificity. On the former, they argue that 
social-relations of power and conflict
9 determine the  significance of accounting, which in turn 
affects such relationships. Instead of assuming a basic harmony of interests in a society where 
power is widely diffused and which results to the unproblematic view of the social value of 
accounting reports, the political economy approach supports the following contrasting views: 
either that society is seen as clearly controlled by a well defined elite or that there is a 
continuing conflict in society between antagonistic classes.
10  Both views of elitist domination 
and pluralist anarchy indicate/testify to the contested value of   accounting reports and 
practices. Thus, accounting reports are hardly impartial and objective, nor is the accountant in 
the position of a disinterested and innocuous historian.  
The latter variable of historical specificity stresses the importance of the 
specific historical and institutional environments comprising the social and political structures 
and cultural values of the society that provide the context for the delivery of  accounting 
reports.  There is recognition that "disequilibrium is a standard feature of the economy" as 
proven by the presence of a few large corporations dominating the economy and that the state 
plays paramount roles in various fields including that of intervening in the determination of 
accounting policies. The historical focus in particular should assist efforts in understanding the 
changing roles of accounting practice and emphasises the importance of historical specificity 
for a fair assessment of the social value of these roles.   
In summary, a political economy of accounting focuses on the institutional 
environment which supports the existing system of corporate reporting.   It looks at the 
accounting function within the broader structural and institutional environment in which it 
operates.  It stresses that political issues cannot be divorced from economic analysis in relation 
to social choices. It revolves around power and whose interests predominate in society which 
inevitably impact upon auditing. Thus, under the political economy approach, the focus on 
social relations leads to the proposition that certain parties possess special interests that often 
influence the audit process.  
Also, with political economy as the theoretical framework, the rationale for 
Malaysia's audit function may be discovered by linking the history of the nation's audit practice 
with the nation's history within  the social,  economic and political spheres. Thus, the 
understanding is viewed as coming about not through the study of separate and overt elements 
      
6of the audit infrastructure and its technical outputs, but through a more comprehensive and in-
depth study of these and other items considered crucial to such an understanding. The 
assumption held throughout is that  audit activities taking place within a certain length of time 
are associated with a unique configuration of social, economic and political conditions. That is, 
these activities are products of  social, economic and political realities and that differences in 
audit activities across several time periods may be traced to  changes in these realities. It is 
very much recognised however, that the "story" told is most probably only one of many.  As 
succinctly noted by Carnegie and Napier (1996, p. 30): “Researchers starting from quite 
distinct theoretical perspectives and with disparate moral and political attitudes could well 
narrate virtually the same chronology of “facts”: how those facts are interpreted is likely to 
differ widely.” 
Data Collection
The study relies on qualitative data gathered by utilising the technique of documentary 
analysis. All the documents referred to, lend insight into the perspectives, assumptions, 
concerns and activities of those who produced them.  The primary written materials assessed 
and analysed  comprise mainly of the annual reports of  accounting bodies such as  the MIA 
and the MACPA and government documents such as the numerous Malaysian Plans.  The 
secondary written sources relied on to provide data on Malaysia's auditing are few and far 
between.  There are conference materials at the ASEAN level where materials on Malaysia's 
auditing are discussed and a few others at national level and books by Gul (1983) and 
Enthoven (1973, 1977). Where it concerns the nation's social, economic and political 
environments,   numerous   secondary   written   sources   were   accessed   including   various 
authoritative sources published over the years in and out of the country.  The same was done in 
investigating developments in the nation's history and in systems of relevance to audit: 
corporations, government and capital funds.
Much of these materials were collected during the field work which took place 
in the first six months of 1997. However, the rest, especially in the area of accounting/auditing 
in Malaysia, were collected long before the field work began and   culminated with the 
publication of a book published locally (see Azham, 1994).
Finally, it needs to be mentioned that this study forms part of a wider one on 
accounting development in Malaysia in which in-depth interviews with selected personalities 
were conducted.   A number of these personalities were leaders of Malaysia’s accounting 
profession. Where appropriate, materials from these interviews are also introduced in this 
paper to add up to the points raised.  These cases are however very few and far between. 
Details regarding the interviews may be found in Azham (2002). 
Audit in Malaysia Over the Years 
In the following section, the early beginnings of audit development and the 
trials and tribulations faced by a number of players in the audit arena in later years are 
described. It begins with audit developments taking place right after the independence of the 
Malay Federation.  It is followed by the on-goings/goings-on in the audit arena during the 
years when the New Economic Policy (NEP) took place. The section concludes with a 
description of what happened during a period of just over ten years prior to the onset of the 
Asian Financial Crisis in the third quarter of 1997.  With an application of the theory of 
political economy of accounting, this section also describes developments taking place in areas 
      
7surrounding the audit arena, such as the government and corporate sectors, and their impacts. 
In order  to distinguish this discussion from the one following, more emphasis is however, 
placed on developments taking place within the audit arena. 
The Audit Beginning of a Newly Independent Nation
The passing of the Companies Act 1965 and the Accountants Act 1967 
facilitated the emergence of the initial pattern of audit system, replacing a pre-existing pattern 
where there was no law to govern the operations of companies throughout the newly formed 
federation
11  and a national accounting body to represent all qualified accountants in the 
country. These Malaysian Acts are similar to those found overseas. 
The Companies Act 1965 drew mainly on two sources: the Victoria Companies 
Act of 1961 and the British Companies Act 1948 (Walton, 1986).
12  The former in turn was 
based upon the UK Companies Act 1908, 1929 and 1948 while the latter on the UK 
Companies Act 1929.  The Act placed the requirement on  companies to disclose more than 
ever before.  It also requires companies to keep accounting records so as to have true and fair 
statements prepared and that record keeping should be executed in such a way so as to enable 
the records to be conveniently and properly audited.  
In matters  of auditing, the Act stressed the need for the auditor to be 
independent. This is illustrated in cases where he or she is not allowed to be an officer or 
director or had share holding (either direct or indirect) with the companies audited.   In 
addition, the auditor was given  very broad powers  in relation to matters of inspecting records 
and obtaining information for the audit and had the right to attend and address   general 
meetings of the company.  As in the earlier Companies Ordinance 1946, the academic and 
professional qualifications of the auditor were not specified.  However, under section 8 of the 
Companies Act, a person had to apply to the Finance Minister in order to gain license to 
become a company auditor.
13  In order to get the license, he or she besides being a Malaysian 
resident, had to be able to satisfy the Finance Minister of his or her good character and 
competence to perform the duties of an auditor.  The passing of the Accountants Act 1967 
roughly a year after the Companies Act came into existence had ensured however that being a 
member of the MIA was a requirement before one could be given the permission to audit 
although the Companies Act 1965 has not made that clear (Shing, 1981, p. 32;  Abu-Hassan, 
1986, p. 4).
The Accountants Act 1967 resembles the Singapore Society of Accountants 
Ordinance 1963 which in turn was based upon the New Zealand Society of Accountants Act - 
the main difference being that the Malaysian Act was "much briefer" and thus "less explicit" 
than the Singaporean Ordinance (Hai, 1970/71, pp. 27-28). With the Accountants Act 1967 
coming into existence in September that year, the MIA emerged as the nation’s accounting 
statutory body.  Section   6  of  the  Act notes   five  functions   of  the  MIA including   the 
responsibility to regulate the practice and promote the interests of the profession and to 
determine the qualifications of persons for purposes of admission as members.  With regards 
to the latter in particular, the MIA is required to maintain a register of accountants. These 
accountants fall under one of three categories of membership: public, registered and licensed 
accountants.
14  
To ensure that only qualified people whose principal place of residence is 
Malaysia can act as public and registered accountants, the MIA through the Accountants Act 
has made it illegal under Sections 22 and 23 for anybody to hold him/herself out as a public, 
registered or licensed accountant or adopt, use or exhibit these titles or others such as auditors, 
      
8tax consultants and tax adviser.
15 Any transgression would mean the person being held liable 
for a maximum fine of  RM 1000 or imprisonment for up to one year for the first offence and 
with subsequent transgressions being liable for a maximum fine of  RM 2000 or imprisonment 
of two years. In short, as stated in the House of Representatives' Parliamentary Debates (Vol. 
IV, No. 12, Col. 2409 dated 25 Aug. 1967), the Act is intended to make provision for the 
adequate control of the accounting profession as a whole, and this control is to be entrusted to 
the MIA  under the establishment of the Act. 
Finally,  the accounting body MACPA, as opposed to that of the MIA,  was 
established through the initiative of the private sector.  To be more precise, in less than one 
year after independence, on 26 July 1958, twenty local accountants who were formerly 
members of the Malayan branch of the Association of Chartered and Incorporated Accountants 
(ACIA) and the Malayan branch of the Association of Certified and Corporate Accountants 
(ACCA), both established in 1936, came together and incorporated the Malayan (later 
Malaysian) Association of Certified Public Accountants (MACPA) in Singapore under the 
Straits Settlement Companies Ordinance 1940 (CERPASS, Dec. 1967, p. 51The MACPA was 
modelled upon the Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales (ICAEW) and is a 
good example of those accounting professional bodies described by Parker (1989) as following 
the British institutions of professional accountancy. 
The newly independent nation appeared set on ensuring that activities in the 
nation’s audit arena would fulfill the need for foreign investors. The same appeared to be the 
case in the related area of taxation where the government in its attempts to attract industrial 
investment from overseas had brought upon itself the criticism of providing foreigners with 
excessive tax exemptions (Lim, 1973, p. 261; Edwards, 1975, Section 5.2). Specifically, 
among  limited companies in the manufacturing sector in 1971, the effective rates of direct 
taxation on profits were 67.6 percent and 39.9 percent for local and foreign companies, 
respectively. As for all limited companies in 1971, the rates were 59.8 percent and 39.5 
percent, respectively (Jomo, 1986, p. 222). All this apparently took place when the rates of 
reinvestment
16  by  foreign-owned   companies   were  much   less   compared   to   local-owned 
companies (see Hirschman, 1971, pp. 26, 30, Table 6; Peng, 1979, p. 192, Table 4.4; and 
Lindenberg, 1973).  
With the occurrence of conflicts between Malays and Chinese in 1969, it was 
realised that for the long term good of the country,  changes needed to take place in the 
nation’s economy and other sectors of Malaysian life.  Thus, the subsequent implementation of 
the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1971 heralded a new era where  foreign interests now had 
to play a secondary role to those inside the country – in particular that of the government 
which entered the corporate sector in full steam.   This had  a profound impact on the audit 
arena as is discussed under the next section. 
Audit in the NEP Era
For years, there had been underlying tensions  between the Malays and Chinese. In May 1969, 
the tensions boiled over/escalated to a point with the Malays and the Chinese being involved in 
riots on the streets of Kuala Lumpur and resulting in nearly two hundred  deaths and hundreds 
more injured.
17  The racial riots had jolted many parties to the realisation that more riots could 
take place in the future as long as the country remained the same socially, politically and 
economically.  Thus, drastic measures had to be taken in many fields. In the socio-economic 
field, the NEP was initiated in 1971 with the goals of eradicating poverty - regardless of race 
      
9and irrespective of geographical location - and reducing imbalances in income, employment 
and ownership of assets among the various races in the country. In attempting to meet these 
objectives by 1990, the government implemented a number of strategies.
Among the notable ones are the pursuance of an ownership and employment 
restructuring program imposed on both non-indigenous domestic and foreign owned firms 
(Zainal-Aznam, 1991a; Jesudason, 1989; Woon and Kam, 1989; Onn, 1989; Means, 1986; 
Chan and Horii, 1986; Redha, 1985; Woon, 1982).  As a result, laws such as the Petroleum 
Development (Amendment) Act and the Industrial Coordination Act were passed in 1975 
which had the goal of greater government control over industries.   Large and powerful 
merchant agency houses such as Guthrie and Sime Darby now had to employ more Malays to 
fill the quota, restructure their capital to meet the Malay equity requirements and enter into 
joint ventures with entities established by the government. 
With foreign interests no longer being of paramount importance in the nation’s 
economy, the earlier “carrots” such as the Companies Act 1965 (which requires companies to 
undergo audit annually) and the Accountants’ Act 1967 (which resulted  to the establishment 
of the MIA as the national accounting body in 1967) were (left unapplied)/inactive until the 
second half of 1980s – when changes to a large extent, were made to the NEP.  Thus, the 
promising beginnings in the audit arena of the 1960s had gone nowhere by the end of the 
decade.  Perhaps this was inevitable in a context where the strong presence of the government 
and the increasing involvement of local Chinese in the corporate sector signified that these 
corporations were owned, managed and funded by people from their own respective Malay and 
Chinese communities who shared goals that were not only economic but also social and 
political.  The enterprises were registered as companies but in  reality they were unlike those 
known as companies in the Western sense of the word "company" with conflicting interests 
from different parties.   There was thus little need for the   “independent” auditor and 
accordingly a strong, capable representative professional cum regulatory body to be around. 
The MIA in Doldrums.  Following the appointment of the then Accountant-General
18 as the 
MIA's president on 31 May 1968, no single AGM was conducted in the following two 
decades.  The MIA under the leadership of the Accountant General,  which finally came to an 
end in April 1987, presumably took over the role of "registering body".
19  But even this was 
delegated   to   the  audit   firm   Price  Waterhouse.   In  1982,   the   MACPA   took   over   this 
responsibility.  (See a set of untitled bounded documents in the MIA library, stamped on its 
first page as "Confidential" and dated 1 October 1988 and which appears to have been 
forwarded to the then Finance Minister by the MIA Council to gain his approval for the 
various amendments suggested for the Accountants Act 1967.  Hereinafter, it will be referred 
to as the "MIA 1988 Bounded Document".) 
The role of the MIA as “registering body” in those two decades was well 
articulated by the MIA president, Haji Hanifah Noordin, just before the first MIA annual 
general meeting in 1987.  He said that ".... the earlier members of the [MIA] council could not 
be entirely blamed for the inactive state of the MIA because in the earlier years it was felt that 
it should only be involved in its limited role of registering accountants in the country" 
(Business Times, 10 Sept. 1987). Unfortunately, the MIA did not execute that   function 
successfully.  In other words, there were those fully qualified to register with the MIA who had 
failed to do so.   Thus, just a few months after the MIA was activated in 1987, it was 
discovered that as of 29 February, 1988, of the country's 6000 or so qualified accountants, only 
      
104453 had registered themselves with the MIA (NST, 20 March 1988). The remainder who did 
not register were comprised of 600 members of the MACPA, 800 of the Chartered Association 
of Certified Accountants (CACA) and 200 accounting graduates from local universities.  
It may  be said with certainty that nothing substantial had actually taken place in 
the 1970s except for the passing of Accountants' Rules in 1972 which, however, were not 
enforced due to the nonexistence of the statutory investigative and disciplinary committees 
which could only be formed by the MIA after an AGM.  Thus, as reported by The Malay Mail 
(13 Jan. 1988), just a few months after the MIA was activated in 1987: "The recently activated 
Institute has formed investigation and disciplinary committees in September to regulate the 
profession - after 20 years of existence." And the MIA president himself mentioned in a 
seminar paper (Hanafiah, 1990, p. 17): "There was no enforcement of the Accountants Act 
1967 in its twenty years of dormancy."  
In the meantime, with a very discouraging picture for auditing helmed by a body 
behaving as if it was representing the majority if not all of the company auditors then, various 
debilitating outcomes took place in the nation’s audit arena not only within the next ten years, 
but also in the  1970s, and continued well into the following decade.  Two of such notable 
outcomes are the disciplinary chaos and the proliferation of unqualified accountants/auditors. 
Disciplinary Chaos. The investigation and disciplinary committees of the MIA were not 
established until September 1987 after its first AGM. As a result, in the area of professional 
ethics and their enforcement, the Malaysian accounting profession, up to the late 1980s when 
the MIA was activated, appeared to be in a state of chaos. This is perhaps  illustrated by  the 
remarks made by the then MACPA president, Subimal Sen Gupta in 1986 where he mentioned 
that the MACPA as a "private body" could only be strict with  members who did not comply 
with the body's ethical code and that the body had no control over those who were not 
members but who deserved to be disciplined.   He also said (The Malaysian Accountant, Oct. 
1986, p. 4):
20 
The MACPA has no control over the issue of the audit license to individuals which 
qualifies them to act as Approved Company Auditors.   This license is issued by the 
Ministry of Finance by reference to the Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA). I 
therefore appeal to both these bodies to take cognisance of the disciplinary actions taken by 
MACPA against its members by taking appropriate action against them if they are also 
members of the MIA and holders of the audit license.  More importantly perhaps there 
should be a mechanism for taking action against those who are not members of MACPA. 
The MACPA will be pleased to assist in this respect. 
It is  also worth noting what was revealed in the letter published in 1988 in the NST.  In the 
letter written by a person who signed him/herself as "Disgusted", he described the mess in the 
then audit practice (NST, 6 Aug. 1988): "In the past, any attempt [by the MACPA] at 
disciplinary control over errant members resulted in those members discontinuing their 
membership with the MACPA and continuing to practice as public accountants as they are 
allowed to do under the Accountants Act 1967."
Proliferation of Unqualified Accountants/Auditors.  The 1967 Accountants Act states that only 
those with recognised qualifications may practice or call themselves accountants/auditors. 
However, with the MIA not fulfilling its policing role, unqualified accountants holding either 
unrecognised qualifications, part qualifications or no qualification had the opportunity to 
appear and grow with the then expanding economy in the 1970s and early 1980s.   As stated in 
      
11the MIA 1988 Annual Report (p. 13): "The problem of unqualified accountants, both in 
practice and in commerce and industry, had proliferated to serious proportions during the 
period of inactivity of the Institute." In early 1988, the MIA president disclosed that a study 
completed in 1981 (by what appeared to be the MACPA) found that there were 200 to 300 
people who were not qualified accountants who were active as public accountants, auditors 
and tax advisers in the country (Berita Harian, 13 Jan. 1988). The number of unqualified 
accountants was amended later on in late 1988 to 3,000 with those  employed totalling  15,000 
(NST, 5 Nov. 1988). Most of the unqualified public accountants were also now identified to 
have come from corporate secretarial and administrative firms (The Star, 5 Nov. 1988).  
Also in 1988, the MIA had pointed out that  unqualified accountants acting as 
auditors would collaborate with the qualified auditors in the sense that the latter would be paid 
a token fee (normally a 30 percent cut) for certifying and endorsing financial statements that 
had presumably been audited earlier by the unqualified auditors (NST, 20 March 1988). In the 
MIA 1988 Annual Report, the following was stated (p. 14): "The unqualified accountants 
would not have been able to function if not for some of our errant members who are prepared 
to sign the accounts prepared by them without any question at all."   In 1993, the MIA 
estimated that there were between 50 and 100 licensed accounting firms collaborating with 
unqualified accountants (NST, 28 Jan. 1993).
21
Overall, audit practice in Malaysia during the NEP era was in an uncertain and unsatisfactory 
state. While the MIA remained largely uninfluential, the privately organised MACPA with its 
power limited to only a fraction of the accountants population in the country and controlled by 
the internationally affiliated audit firms whose clients would include foreign investors, was left 
free by the government to do what it felt was right with hardly any interference or much 
expectation from the government. This led to the picture that financial reporting and the 
related matter of external auditing was largely superfluous in a society where the government 
as the main engine of the economy was not just the regulator but also the so-called user and 
preparer of audited statements  -  except in cases where there was a need for funds from 
foreigners to invest in the manufacturing sector who thus for one reason or another demanded 
the presence of company audit and thus the external auditor.
22   The events of the 
1970s, the May 13th 1969 Tragedy and the subsequent implementation of the NEP  pushed the 
government to get heavily involved in the nation's economy.  In the 1980s, the two economic 
recessions in the first six years of the decade and the financial debacles of numerous 
companies including those owned by the government forced the government to turn to the 
private sector to take over its role as the engine of the nation's economy. Therefore, whereas 
growth was previously based on expansionary public expenditure, from the late 1980s onward 
most of the economic growth was to be attributed to private sector activities – with perhaps the 
expected inevitable impacts on the nation’s audit practice.  
Accounting’s Rejuvenation with the End of the NEP?  
There were two economic recessions experienced by the country during the 1980s. The first 
one was mild and took place in 1981-82 when the rest of the world also experienced recession. 
In response, the government embarked on a number of strategies to stimulate the economy 
(Yan, 1994, p. 314; Abdullah, 1986). These efforts did not bear much fruit when   the 
subsequent economic slowdown in   industrialised countries impacted on the then fragile 
Malaysian economy. Thus, another recession took place in 1985-86. This recession was 
marked by reduction in national income, government revenues, consumer spending and 
investment and the worst scenario that the nation  had to face since independence (Mohd.-
      
12Salleh, 1994, pp. 622-623).  At its wake, the government intensified  efforts to attract foreign 
investors to the country's manufacturing sector.  Thus,  almost all NEP requirements were 
waived for export-oriented manufacturing industries. There was the “de-emphasising” of the 
restructuring prong of the NEP,
23 which led to a more liberal treatment of private enterprises, 
especially  direct   foreign   investment,   and   a   softening   stance   towards   restructuring   the 
ownership   of   share  capital   of   companies   and   raising   the  threshold   for   manufacturing 
companies so that they escaped the requirements imposed by  the Industrial Coordination Act 
(ICA) (Zainal-Aznam, 1994, p. 597). Thus, the NEP had to some extent, come to an end 
around this time and not in 1990 as planned in the early 1970s.
With a few facets of the NEP pretty much set aside and the private sector  now 
to assume the role of the engine of the economy, the government began a series of programmes 
to facilitate the expansion of private sector businesses. These included the implementation of 
various strategies to upgrade the operation of the KLSE (see Azham, 1994) and a major 
amendment to the Companies Act 1985 in the second half of 1980s.   The former  had 
apparently helped in ensuring the KLSE to grow  by leaps and bound in the late 1980s (see 
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange and Malaysian Strategic Consultancy Sdn. Bhd., 1992, pp. 28-
29) and also later in the first half of 1990s
24. However, the major amendment to the Companies 
Act seems not to have resulted to any significant changes in the manner intended for  audit 
practice  in the country.  The same may be said on the revival of the MIA in 1987.  This and 
more are discussed under the next heading. 
Companies Act’s Amendment.  In 1985, the Companies Act was substantially revised (Sum 
and Wishart, 1989).  Apparently the aim among others is to attract foreigners to invest in the 
country, through placing greater emphasis on the need for those associated with companies to 
be more accountable, and to provide greater protection for minority shareholders, who would 
include these foreigners. The revised Act which became effective from 1 February, 1986 made 
extensive changes to the existing Ninth Schedule to incorporate those elements that are 
regarded as best accounting standards and practices leading towards a much higher disclosure 
level than previously. Where it concerns auditing in particular, the 1985 amendment requires 
for the first time all public accounting firms and  individual partners of such firms to register 
with the Registrar of Companies (ROC).  Each partner is allocated a number that must be cited 
in all audit reports.  In addition, the amendment increases the range of persons excluded from 
acting as auditor.  It appears that the purpose of this provision is to identify and sanction those 
company secretaries operating as auditors (Phenix, 1986, p. 12).  Furthermore, the term of an 
audit license is reduced from three to two years and the procedure for granting licenses 
overhauled to make it a more effective method of monitoring and policing standards of 
auditing.  
Finally, an auditor is required to report to the ROC if he or she were to find that 
there has been a breach or non-observance of any provisions of the Act.  The onus is on the 
auditor to justify why he has not reported a breach of the Act to the Registrar. This seems to be 
a major break with the tradition in Malaysian Company Law as it is based on the British 
system, although it can be found in the corresponding sections of the Australian and 
Singaporean Acts.  Failure to report could result in a requirement for the auditor to justify in a 
court of law his or her opinion that the breaches have been otherwise adequately dealt with by 
either one of these two approaches: by a comment about such matter in his or her audit report 
or by bringing the matter to the attention of the company directors.  The fulfilment of either of 
these two approaches ensures that the reporting duty of an auditor to the Registrar is a limited 
one.   Nevertheless, the significance of this requirement is that Malaysian auditors are now 
provided with a channel to report non-observance of the Act.  Previously, the auditor could 
      
13only use the audit report and by the time the report was presented to the members of the 
company, the damage caused by the transgressions might well have been irreparable. Section 
174(8) of the Act also makes it clear that the auditor preparing the report would be protected 
by the law. 
This particular 1985 amendment to the Companies Act 1965 has increased the 
auditor's statutory responsibilities in certain respects but at the same time provided the auditors 
with some additional protection.   With or without the protection however, it appears that 
auditors as represented by the MIA, are not that happy with the additional reporting 
responsibility. This was openly remarked by the MIA president at a seminar. He mentioned 
(Hanafiah, 1990, p. 10): "In recent years this legislative intervention in the area of disclosure of 
certain matters to the regulatory authorities seems to be the trend. It is hoped that the public 
perception of the accountants' independence is not impaired as a result of such legal 
interference in the accountant-client relationship."
Perhaps more important than whether or not the auditors are happy with the 
additional reporting responsibility concerns the question of whether auditors who show their 
failure to abide with the reporting duty to an external party have in fact been taken to task by 
the authorities through criminal charges of fraud/conspiracy.  At the present time there has 
been no news of such action by the government.  In the early 1990s however,  the then minister 
of domestic trade and consumer affairs  noted the following at a conference after saying that 
auditors had moral and legal responsibilities towards shareholders to report any irregularities 
to the authorities (NST, 29 Jan. 1991): "My ministry cannot implement and enforce the 
relevant laws effectively without the feedback and co-operation from your members.  For your 
information, in the past five years the Registrar of Companies only received two reports under 
this section."  The following year, he said (NST, 17 Dec. 1992): “Auditors are still avoiding 
their responsibilities under the law to report any breach or non-compliance of the Companies 
Act 1965 to the Registrar of Companies."  He also said that although only a handful of such 
reports had been received from the auditors, the ROC's inspection and enforcement work had 
revealed that a lot more companies had failed to comply with the law.  He  warned  auditors 
that "appropriate action" would be taken against those who did not carry out their duties 
conscientiously. He said that the law - Section 174(8) - had made it clear that an auditor who 
failed to make such report was liable to spend two years in jail and/or pay RM 30,000.  
MIA’s Revival.  Though interviews provided a very confusing picture of the reasons and 
parties involved in the activation of the MIA (see Azham, 2002), the available documents were 
very clear in stating that it was the government which wanted the MIA to be active so that it 
could play the role of  national accounting body as envisaged by the Accountants Act 1967 
(Akauntan Nasional, July 1992, p. 5; Berita Harian, 13 Jan. 1988).  The exact reasons for the 
MIA   being activated and the important role played by the government in ensuring the 
activation were revealed in the "MIA 1988 Bounded Document".  It was stated (pp. 5-6) that 
when the then federal cabinet rejected the MACPA proposal for the merger of the MACPA 
with the MIA,
25 the MIA was "directed" by the government to be active. The document went 
on to state that the government did so because of the state of the then accounting profession 
reflected in various financial scandals which resulted with a loss of confidence in the 
profession among the general public and foreign businessmen.  This document also pointed out 
that the government would like the MIA to be activated due to the proliferation of unqualified 
accountants who had caused the government to incur millions of ringgit of losses as a result of 
falsification of their clients' accounts. 
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of the MIA in 1987, had mentioned what appeared to be the goals set by the government for 
the MIA to achieve once it was revived (The Malaysian Accountant, Oct-Dec. 1987, p. 8): "As 
the Minister responsible for implementing the Accountants Act it is my hope that members of 
the Institute will make the MIA an effective professional body responsible for looking after 
professional standards, education and training and supervision over the professional conduct of 
members."
26  He continued saying that cases of fraud in the corporate and financial sectors in 
the country had raised questions on the role played by the auditors.   He pointed out that 
auditors owed a professional duty to the investing public to point out any illegal activity in the 
company and come out with appropriate audit reports.  He stressed the following picture of 
what the government envisaged for the accounting profession: "As for the government, it 
would like to see an accountancy profession that is capable of providing professional work of 
the highest standard in serving the various needs of the sophisticated business community and 
earning the trust and respect of society."
Though these remarks point clearly the role and responsibilities of the MIA 
after its activation, it is quite difficult to say that overall the MIA in its first decade of being 
active has been successful in fulfilling them.  In fact, it can be argued that the MIA has failed 
to achieve much as a regulator of the profession.  Instead it has been preoccupied with various 
efforts to promote the profession. These and more are discussed next.
Regulatory Failure.  The fact that since the early 1980s white-collar crime in its various forms 
has proliferated in the country is well known (see Koon, 1994).  Right after the MIA was 
activated, it appears that various parties in the country have made their feelings known that 
they would like members of the accounting profession to conduct themselves with professional 
integrity.  Among these speakers, Datuk Paduka (later Tun) Daim Zainuddin and Tun Ismail 
Ali had in fact mentioned the MIA by name as the party to play the required role in this field 
(see endnote number 2).   Indeed, it was none other than the MIA president himself who 
concurred with the idea of the important role to be played by the MIA in this matter. On the 
night before the MIA's first AGM in 1987, the MIA president mentioned what he has 
continued to repeat over the next three years: the MIA aims to be a strong regulatory body (see 
MIA 1988 Annual Report, p. 6; MIA 1989 Annual Report, p. 7; Hanafiah, 1990, p. 15). 
Specifically on that night of 1987, he said (The Malaysian Accountant, Oct-Dec 1987, p. 10):  
Speaking of image, the Institute must endeavour to restore the credibility the profession has 
lost in the eyes of the public.  Several corporate failures such as the recent co-operative 
scandal can be attributed to apparent audit failures.  These must be pursued and investigated 
by the Institute in order to discipline those members who have been negligent and to clear 
the names of those who have not been negligent.  Only the MIA can do this as it has been 
endowed with such disciplinary powers encompassing the whole profession under the Act.  
He stressed that after the inaugural AGM when the MIA was then able to establish/create its 
investigation and disciplinary committees, that the council would have to make "a determined 
effort" to clean up the image of the profession.  The MIA president even mentioned that to 
ensure a more effective policing by the MIA in the future, there would be a  joint investigation 
and disciplinary body comprising representatives from the Treasury, Registrar of Companies 
and Registrar of Cooperatives. He  also volunteered to have the MIA  take over the "policing" 
task over the auditors handled by "a monitoring committee" in the Finance Ministry.
      
15With this apparent early desire to be a strong regulator, a few months after the MIA first AGM, 
The Malay Mail (13 Jan. 1988) reported that following complaints against 15 accountants 
lodged by companies, fellow accountants and government departments. The MIA was going 
all out to clean up the act of errant accountants.  The MIA president was reported to have said 
that 15 accountants were under investigation for alleged malpractice and criminal breach of 
trust.  He also said that the accountants faced being de-registered while court prosecution 
awaited those who had violated the Accountants Act 1967.  And in 1988 and early 1989, there 
were a number of reports in the NST on what the MIA leaders would do to errant members. 
The headlines of the news reports said all:  "MIA May Expel Members Who Break the Rules" 
(21 June 1988); "MIA Warns Members of Stern Action"  (15 July 1988); "MIA May Expel 
Those Abetting Fraud" (17 Oct. 1988); "MIA to Haul Up Accountants Not Following Rules" 
(28 Feb. 1989).   Also on 14 July 1988, reports with the following headlines appeared: 
"Warning from the MIA" (Business Times) and "MIA to Get Rid of Black Sheep" (The Star). 
In the former, the MIA president was reported as saying that the MIA would not condone 
members who "... persistently refuse to comply with the statutory requirements, accounting and 
auditing standards adopted by the Institute." 
However later after the MIA's code of ethics was made effective in April 1990, 
hardly anything like those stated above had come out from the MIA.
27  And if a check were to 
be made of the MIA Annual Reports over the years, one would discover that since the first 
AGM in September 1987 until the AGM in 1996, the MIA's disciplinary committees had only 
taken disciplinary actions against members for the years 1987/88, 1991 and 1992.  In other 
words, in the later years after its activation, it appears that the MIA had not found it "fit" to 
discipline any members where complaints were filed against. Specifically, for the years 
1987/88, 1991 and 1992, four members were disciplined by the MIA each year for a total of 12 
members in its first ten years of active life.
28  Between 1993 and up till  the AGM in 1996, it 
had failed to impose disciplinary actions against its members although the MIA Annual 
Reports showed that “every year” since 1987 (except for the years 1989 and 1990 when not 
much details were disclosed in the MIA Annual Reports on the works done by its investigative 
and disciplinary committees
29) the total number of cases investigated, under review or pending 
had in fact reached 25 (1996), 30 (1995), 25 (1994), "more than ten" (1993), 29 (1992), 28 
(1991), 39 (1990) and 23 (1987/88).
Related to the topic of failing to ensure that its members are in fact doing a 
better job as accountants or auditors and that necessary actions are taken against the errant 
ones, the MIA has also failed to implement the very ideas that its leaders themselves claimed 
needed to be put into action in order to strengthen the nation's audit practice. One of these 
ideas concerned the practice of quality review of  audit firms. The MIA 1992 Annual Report 
(p. 7), Mingguan Malaysia (12 Apr. 1992), Akauntan Nasional (May 1992, p. 26; Nov/Dec. 
1992. p. 31; June 1993, p. 22), NST  (28 July 1992) and finally the MIA 1993 Annual Report 
(p. 15) provided evidence of  the MIA leaders giving glowing details of the need for a quality 
review programme.   Interviews with a number of the MIA council members   produced 
conflicting stories on why the MIA had failed to implement it.  Another area that the MIA had 
failed to put into action is concerned with its various proposals in 1992 related to the subject of 
the  auditor's independence  which the MIA president claimed "ought" to have   been 
implemented with a few other measures to strengthen the profession  (Akauntan Nasional - 
Conference Times, 15 July 1992, p. 1; Business Times, 15 July 1992). It is worth noting the 
      
16following remark that he made when talking about the various proposals (Akauntan Nasional, 
15 July 1992): "There is no strong financial centre in the world that is not supported by a 
strong and well developed accountancy profession.  Therefore now is the time for action. Now 
is the time for us to develop ourselves and to give our profession a lift."
Also, in at least one case the MIA had appeared to under perform  as compared 
to its earlier/previous fine efforts.   This is concerned with the  Continuing Professional 
Development (CPD) that was made effective from 1 March 1992 (Akauntan Nasional, March 
1992, p. 22). See the  Akauntan Nasional     (Nov. 1990, p. 20),  NST  (6 Nov. 1990) and 
Akauntan Nasional  (Nov/Dec 1992, pp. 30-31) where the MIA president stressed why the 
MIA needed to have the CPD made compulsory.  However the MIA 1995 Annual Report (p. 
26) disclosed that "changes" that had been introduced in November 1994 and made effective 
from 1 January, 1995 ensured that what took place in the past, where the MIA secretariat was 
the entity responsible for CPD record-keeping, had been  replaced with members themselves 
being made responsible to do the record-keeping individually.   There was no longer any need 
for each member to submit an annual CPD report in a prescribed form. Instead, members 
would be selected at random and asked to produce evidence of compliance.  
Successful Promoter.  After its activation, the MIA had shown the tendency to  promote the 
interest of its members in a number of ways. In October 1988, the MIA submitted a 
memorandum to the Finance Minister requesting that the government  look into the desirability 
and possible methods of limiting the accountant's personal liability for negligence claims. 
The government did not bother to respond to this MIA's proposal.  As if the government's 
indifference was not embarrassing enough, and notwithstanding the apparent positive state 
experienced by local auditors, the MIA had also on 30 January, 1991 launched a professional 
indemnity insurance scheme for its practising members (Akauntan Nasional, July 1992, p. 6). 
But the MIA had failed to get good response from its practising members. After nine months, 
only 10 percent of the some 800-member firms had signed up (NST, 30 Sept. 1991). Thus, the 
MIA president said that the MIA council would have to consider making it mandatory for all 
member firms to be covered by the scheme (NST, 19 Oct. 1991).  
 
The MIA in what appeared to be an all out effort to protect its members' public 
accounting   activities   had   also   started   early   in   1988   a  fight   against   the 
unqualified/unregistered accountants.  From February to November 1988, the MIA resorted 
to  lodging  police reports and at times the MIA senior staff members would join the police to 
raid the premises of these unqualified accountants.  The MIA also hired lawyers to bring the 
matter to court.  By the end of 1988, MIA had lodged 92 police reports and the police had 
raided 19 firms (NST, 5 Nov. 1988).  This approach taken by the MIA received a certain level 
of condemnation from various parties.  For example, the Editorial to the Business Times (5 
March 1988) had noted the following: "Until MIA comes out with its own examinations to 
allow these unregistered accountants to gain local recognition too, it is argued that such a 
tough stance may not be entirely fair." The crackdown ended when the Malaysian Institute of 
Corporate Secretaries and Administrators (MICSA) representing   unregistered accountants 
sent a letter of appeal to the then Finance Minister for a review of the actions taken by the 
MIA (NST, 5 Nov. 1988). Later in 1992, the MIA launched the Malaysian Association of 
Accounting Technicians (MAAT) to house most of these accountants - a move that with 
hindsight did not need the MIA to initiate such a crackdown in the first place.  That was 
precisely what the MIA president claimed in 1989.  He said (Akauntan Nasional, Sept. 1989, 
p. 24): "... with the benefit of hindsight and the number of bogus accountants involved - which 
      
17is estimated at some 3,000 - the Institute should have formed the proposed Malaysian Institute 
of Accounting Technicians (MAAT) first." 
Finally, the MIA in promoting the accounting profession had also proposed 
institutionalising its minimum audit fees schedule (see MIA Council, 1994).  The new ruling 
that governed all MIA practising members was supposed to be effective from 1 January 1992 
(Akauntan Nasional, Feb. 1992, p. 19), but it was later moved to 1 April 1993 (Akauntan 
Nasional, May 1993, p. 16).   At the end it was turned into a mere "guideline" as of 1 
September, 1994. This was because as soon as the minimum fees schedule was implemented, 
the uproar began. The Perak Chinese Chamber of Commerce president suggested that the 
MIA defer its proposal to implement its minimum audit fees schedule on 1 April, 1993 (NST, 
17 Feb. 1993).   He claimed that the MIA minimum audit fees were too high and unfair and 
would be a burden for small and medium businesses.  He stressed that the government should 
amend the Accountants Act of 1967 to prevent such exploitation of small businesses by the 
MIA.   The following year, the Federation of Malaysian Manufacturers (FMM) issued a 
statement urging the MIA to review the audit fees schedule (NST, 18 Feb. 1994).  The final 
showdown took place on 19 January, 1994 when the Associated Chinese Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry Malaysia (ACCCIM), the FMM and the MIA plus a few other 
interested parties met the domestic trade and consumer affairs ministry officials including the 
ministry's secretary-general to discuss the new fees structure (NST, 11 Feb. 1994).  A few 
months after this meeting, the MIA president announced that the MIA would drop its 
minimum scale of audit fees effective as from 1 September, 1994 and instead maintain it as a 
guide for its practising members (NST, 2 Aug. 1994).  
It would not be considered an exaggeration to say that the MIA after its 
activation, did not seem to provide much confidence that it was able to regulate itself well. 
This seems to illustrate what Friedland (1989, p. 74) says to be "the tremendous reluctance" 
across accounting professional bodies in the Far East to prosecute their members.  The MIA 
had also failed to implement certain projects that its own leaders argued were necessary for 
strengthening the nation's audit practice.  As if these were not disturbing enough, the MIA in 
the related field of increasing the number of qualified accountants/auditors, had shown that its 
conducts had left much room for improvement.
30
All in all, the MIA during the ten year period following its activation in 1987 
had largely failed to provide much confidence in its role as audit regulator. Unfortunately, the 
authorities did not seem to do much to help improve matters.   From several documented 
sources, it seems that the government was not happy with the MIA during the first few years 
after its activation and had in fact initiated some actions but never really implemented those 
actions.   The government's half-hearted  reaction   to  the  MIA's  self-regulatory  failure in 
particular and the quagmire in the profession in general may be reflected in speeches delivered 
by the then Deputy Finance Minister Loke Yuen Yow in July 1988 (as can be found in 
Appendix 12 in the "MIA 1988 Bounded Document") and later in 1990 (Akauntan Nasional, 
Oct. 1990, p. 21) and also in the speech by the then Finance Minister, Tun Daim Zainuddin, in 
September 1989 (Akauntan Nasional, Sept. 1989, pp. 21-23).  
After the Finance Minister stepped down in 1991, it seemed that not much 
could perhaps be expected from his successor. As a whole, the person who replaced him and 
who had also held the post of deputy prime minister had not been critical of the performance of 
the MIA as a regulator. In fact, he seemed to have a high regard for Malaysia's audit firms and 
the related standard of financial reporting of Malaysian companies (see Akauntan Nasional, 
Sept/Oct 1991, p. 23; The Malaysian Accountant, June 1994, p. 14). From the time he took 
      
18over from Tun Daim Zainuddin, only once - in the very year when he assumed the post -  was 
he critical of the audit executed by local auditors. At the 7th National Accountants Conference, 
he mentioned that the government viewed the lack of credibility of the auditors as a serious 
matter since many auditors had followed the instruction of   company directors or top 
management of the companies in ensuring that the financial statements reflected a misleading 
picture of the company affairs (Utusan Malaysia, 19 Sept. 1991).  
It may be safe to say that the economic recessions of the 1980s had to some 
extent disrupted the pre-existing political, corporate and financial systems in Malaysia.  It had 
also created a perceived need for "structural" (as oppose to in-depth) changes to the audit 
system.  The fact that changes in the audit process focus more on form or appearance but not 
so much on substance, had ensured that not much could perhaps be expected from  auditors 
and their representative accounting body, the MIA. The next section attempts to address the 
issue of  why Malaysia has been so unfortunate in the audit arena.  
Towards Understanding Audit in Malaysia 
The objective of this section of the paper is to explain the distinctive audit phenomenon in 
Malaysia by tracing the historical development of the audit function from 1957 to 1997 and 
analysing   environmental influences on this development. In the previous section, the 
delineation of what took place in the audit arena over the forty year period was  divided into 
three parts.  These three parts may now be condensed into two eras namely: pre-NEP and NEP 
Plus. Both periods have provided evidence of the relevance of the theory of political economy 
of accounting.  
Audit During the Pre-NEP era.  During the pre-NEP era, the passing of the Companies Act 
of 1965 and the Accountants Act of 1967 appeared to signify that the economy was being set 
up to operate under a laissez-faire kind of environment by the government - with the assistance 
of the private sector as shown by the formation of the MACPA in 1958.  The authorities and 
other parties made the necessary moves of ensuring that existing foreign investments stayed 
put and providing for much more investment to flow in through the manufacturing sector.  The 
Parliamentary Debates (Vol. II, no. 8, Col. 1558 dated 9 Aug. 1965) stated specifically that 
the Companies Act 1965 had two objectives: to protect investors and to attract “foreign 
investors” into the country.     Specifically, it was in the interest of foreigners who were 
shareholders and bankers to the merchant agency houses that the right audit infrastructure 
needed to be in place.  
 
With the eruption of violence between Malays and Chinese in 1969, the 
Malaysian economy witnessed a change in direction away from a full free enterprise economy 
to that spearheaded by the government.   Even after the NEP era was supposed to have come to 
an end in 1990, the nation’s economy remained  much in the hands of the government or those 
who were closely associated with it.  As a  consequence, the picture that emerged showed that 
to a very large extent, audits had little rationale for existence.  In other words, the sorry picture 
of the audit from the 1970s onward provides evidence of the minimal value placed on auditing 
in the Malaysian society.  To paraphrase Hopper et al. (1987), auditing development has been 
implicated in the broader ideological and political struggles within the society.  
Audit in the NEP Plus Era.  From the early 1970s with the launching of the NEP until 
perhaps the mid-1980s when the government was forced to redress   the NEP due to the 
occurrence of the 1985-86 economic recession, the one word perhaps best  able to describe the 
      
19 19audit practice was its apparent "neglect" by  political executives. During this period, with the 
MACPA thriving and the presence of the audit section in the Companies Act, it appears that 
the nation’s leaders saw no further need to focus on the audit system.  Examination of what 
took place within the audit arena whereby the accounting statutory body MIA was left inactive 
leading to a number of negative repercussions demonstrates a lack of concern for ensuring that 
the audit and related areas should function appropriately by those parties involved in their 
administration. 
This could possibly be due to the direct access to internal financial information 
and to the corporations' directors by those who were from the government side who  now also 
played the role of shareholders. Such access subverted any strong demand for a truly functional 
audit and related matters. The direct and indirect access to information apparently reduced a 
potential for agency problems except for those deemed to be outsiders. But when these 
outsiders were mainly speculative investors, they appeared to show that they “accepted” 
information asymmetries.  
The authorities might  also have failed to improve upon the audit function due 
to the fact that they did not want  accounting practitioners to make their life unnecessarily 
difficult given the "underhand" acts that they committed (or had to commit) to ensure the goals 
of NEP (and/or "their own") were fulfilled at "whatever" price. This very point was made clear 
by the leader of Aliran, the NGO for "freedom, justice and solidarity" in Malaysia, Chandra 
Muzaffar when he tried to explain the reluctance of national leaders to take action against 
those responsible for corrupt activities (Chandra, 1989, p. 99).
31  He wrote: "To expose their 
misdemeanours would be to expose the New Economic Policy's not so subtly concealed 
agenda of creating Malay capitalists, whatever the costs and the consequences.  Ethics have to 
be set aside for the time being - so it has been argued in certain official circles - to facilitate the 
rapid growth of a Malay capitalist class."
Overall,  audit in Malaysia during the NEP era was in an unstable and 
unsatisfactory state. Unfortunately, the situation did not really improve  even after the NEP 
came to an unofficial end in 1985.  Although this time period saw the revival of the MIA in 
1987 and the Companies Act 1965 heavily amended in 1985 resulting in additional duties and 
responsibilities for accountants and auditors, the audit transformation might be safely said to 
be superficial. Specifically, the actions of MIA in the regulatory field and the implementation 
of the auditors’ ROC reporting duty under the amended  Companies  Act were below 
expectations. And yet there did not seem to be any decisive efforts on the part of those with the 
power and authority to see that these were improved.
32 
It is a fact that for auditing to reach its potential,  transparency in conduct, and a 
situation in which those making decisions can be held accountable is required. All these 
requirements did not fit the Malaysian environment as succinctly described in mid-1997 by the 
Editorial to the NST  (7 June 1997): 
At the pace of its economic growth, Malaysia, too will feel the vice of corruption sooner or 
later. Like others before it, this country will also try to look the other way, and do as much 
as it can to avoid rocking the economic boat.  Like their Asian peers, politicians will trust to 
the moral superiority of a few good men to keep the others in line.  And there is always the 
argument against washing dirty linen in public, the stubborn loyalty of politicians to their 
compatriots, and an equally obstinate  belief that corruption is confined to an indiscreet 
minority.  In politics, hard choices require courage and often pose uncertain risks  - which 
is why politicians will try to postpone them until their hands are forced.  The instinct of 
      
20self-preservation will usually urge politicians to control the damage done by disclosures of 
corruption, rather than attempt to root it out.  (Emphasis added.)
There were six reasons (in italics) disclosed by the Editorial as to why corruption could be 
considered to have gone unhampered, and as disclosed by the Anti-Corruption Agency, 
corruption had been on the rise over the last 20 years and tougher punishments were needed 
(New Sunday Times, 8 June 1997). The people could not perhaps expect much from their 
accountants and auditors when their elected leaders did not seem to think that it was their 
responsibility to ensure that their "compatriots" were really conducting themselves with 
integrity. For one reason or another,   leaders acted with much leniency ensuring cases of 
corruption were swept under the carpet, and the auditors who might have incurred audit 
failures could expect in turn that they would be able to go scot-free everytime a business 
collapsed and financial scandal erupted.
33  
Specifically, in Malaysia, the MIA although it was revived in 1987, was not 
expected to emerge as a strong accounting body able to play the required role in confronting 
cases of corruption, nepotism and patron-clientelism that had been plaguing the country for 
many decades but particularly in the few years prior to the onset of the Asian Financial Crisis 
in 1997.  In short, it was in the interest of certain sections in the Malaysian society to see a 
malfunctioning audit marked by an incapable accounting professional body and a weak 
enforcement of a company law section on auditor’s reporting duty to ROC. Therefore, while 
the MIA council members appeared to be ineffective and those overseeing the audit related 
sections of amended Companies Act had failed to play their role, others with the power to 
make corrections had not translated their words into actions.
This failure by the power elite to take the appropriate actions could also be 
traced to the case of the MIA-MACPA rivalry and that of the enforcement of Malaysian 
Accounting Standards Board (MASB) standards. Details of these two cases may be found in 
Azham   (2002).   See  also   Susela  (1999).   Briefly,   on   the   former,   the  series   of   public 
disagreements between leaders of the MIA and MACPA had failed to force the authorities to 
make a stance as to which body they  saw as the leader of the nation’s accounting profession 
(Malaysian Business, 16 Aug. 1988, p. 19; Malaysian Business, 1 Aug. 1996, p. 1).  As for the 
latter, the establishment of the MASB by the government in mid-1997 to take over from the 
MIA the responsibility of setting accounting standards had failed in ensuring that it was 
equipped with the power of enforcement – though early on in 1994 (The Malaysian 
Accountant, June 1994, pp. 14-15) and later in the following year the then Finance Minister in 
his 1996 budget speech (NST, 28 Oct. 1995) did mention such a need.  The failure to act 
accordingly could only mean that those with power were not really serious in seeing the 
emergence of a well-respected accounting profession and high quality financial reports. 
  
For what appears to be an act of “too little too late” coming from the authorities, 
just several months before the country was dragged into the quagmire of the Asian Financial 
Crisis 1997-98, the ROC was reported to have sent its few officers scurrying around the 
country to check audit working papers of audit firms (Business Times, 21 Feb. 1997). The fact 
that this activity by the ROC which had never been conducted before (as found in an interview 
with the Companies’ Registrar himself) happened to coincide with the efforts conducted by 
yours truly (to interview personalities such as the former finance minister Tun Daim Zainuddin 
and the Companies’ Registrar) had led yours truly to conclude that there was more to this 
action of the ROC than what met the eye.   These accountants were supposed to complete their 
task at the end of the year.  However, there did not appear to be any reported news on the 
outcome of their operation till later during the following year.
34 In the interview conducted 
      
21with the Companies’ Registrar, he  stated that the investigations had uncovered that some of 
the complaints that he received from various parties including shareholders on the "correctness 
of accounts" and "quality of auditing" were found to be valid.  Furthermore, he said that it had 
been found that the MIA "had not carried out the task of regulating its members to the ROC's 
satisfaction".
Capitalism per se does not require external audit.  This is especially the case 
when the capitalism one refers to is the cooperative, insider or crony type (see Kunio, 1988). 
The so-called independent audit is an antithesis to such economy.  Thus, in Malaysia, one may 
find evidence where what may be considered a cornerstone for external audit is downplayed by 
those who should know better.  In an interview which took place in 1988, Datuk Mohamad of 
the audit firm Hanafiah, Raslan and Mohamad (HRM) mentioned what took place in 1964, 
"when all the large accountancy practices in the country were owned and dominated by 
foreigners" (Malaysian Business, 16 Aug. 1988, p. 13): "The late Tun Razak (who was then 
the deputy prime minister and later prime minister) called the three of us [he and his two 
colleagues] in one day and said: 'Why don't you guys set up a local auditing firm?  At least try. 
If  you can't make it, we'll take you back'."  Next he was quoted as saying: "It was a difficult 
decision to make .... [b]ut we were lucky to receive a lot of assistance from Tun Razak.  Right 
from the beginning, big clients like the National Electricity Board (NEB), the Police 
Cooperative, the Social Welfare Department and many government-related statutory bodies 
had their accounts audited by us."  When the 1970s arrived with the government playing  a 
much bigger role in the economy, HRM being the only "Bumiputra accounting firm" around 
was hired to audit the burgeoning number of public enterprises and other government entities. 
Note also that when it concerned the local Chinese auditors, the MIA's official 
journal, Akauntan Nasional (Dec. 1990, p. 18), had reported how some MIA members "with 
small practice" were having difficulty with the newly issued MIA Code of Ethics related to the 
need for auditors to be independent. As a result, the chairman of the MIA's Ethics Committee, 
Khoo Eng Choo, noted the following (Akauntan Nasional, Dec. 1990, p. 18): “The Committee 
is more concerned with the auditors of public listed companies rather than with auditors of 
family companies.”
All in all, in the absence of widespread stock ownership and less than a free 
market to allocate resources, monitoring of management operations can perhaps be provided 
by other methods which differ from external audits. Probably in Malaysia that has always been 
the case – though to what extent  such monitoring is done professionally is anyone’s guess. 
Thus, by the time the nation experienced the damage brought about by the Asian Financial 
Crisis 1997-97, audit in Malaysia could hardly be regarded as an intrinsic and constitutive 
component of the government of economic life.  In other words, its presence to a good extent 
was devoid of meaning.  Not surprisingly, the nation’s audit arena was filled with lost hope 
and utter neglect.  Just another story of the triumph of hope over experience that Malaysians 
are so used to.   
Conclusions 
Although there have been numerous studies such as those by Enthoven (1977, 1973) on the 
role of accounting in economic development and others such as the effect of international 
transfer of accounting skills (Seidler, 1967; Needles, 1976), accounting is constantly seen as a 
technical activity which provides financial information for economic development. The 
      
22scholarly works are invariably normative and are deemed located in the functionalist paradigm. 
Thus, they fail to examine how accounting is very much a reflection of the society it is located 
in. There always appears to be a lack of attention to developing countries' socio-economic 
factors which impact upon accounting resulting in/to suggestions that the transfer of Western 
accounting technologies and ideas would be unproblematic and undeniably and automatically 
beneficial to these countries  - though experience time and again appears to prove otherwise.
    
The use of the theory of political economy in this paper in explaining the 
rationale for auditing in Malaysia should help  address the issue of  lack of accounting studies 
in developing countries where accounting is regarded as a part of the wider socio-economic 
and political context. In other words, in the very notion of accounting propagated by Burchell 
et al. (1985) where the accounting processes and institutions are not so much influenced by the 
wider social, economic and political environments as "inter-twined" with them, and thus, as 
proposed by Hopper and Powell (1985, p. 93), need to be studied together. 
The Malaysian audit story covering a period of the first forty years after 
independence in 1957, has provided evidence of the character of auditing as a social activity 
within a specific network of changeable social relations.  It is embedded in its social, economic 
and political context.  Time and again, factors surrounding audit have had an impact on the 
audit process itself.  Audit in Malaysia therefore cannot be interpreted  simply as a technical 
phenomenon residing outside the social domain.  
From a practice originating as a consequence of the need perceived by the 
national leaders in the late 1950s and 1960s to maintain the status quo in the nation’s modern 
economy, following the launching of the NEP in early 1970s, the function of auditing in the 
Malaysian society was in most cases devoid of any essence of mission; instead, it was created, 
shaped and changed by the pressures which gave rise to its development over time. The role 
that it served was intertwined in the contexts in which it operated.  As has been noted by 
Hopper et al. (1987), accounting development has been implicated in broader ideological and 
political struggles in the society.
The basic structural purpose of the audit in Malaysia as presented in several 
authoritative sources such as Company Law is really nothing more than to provide the "image" 
of a modern economy to attract investments from overseas. It is a kind of representation that is 
not supported by   reality on the basis of much of the nation's history after independence. 
Specifically, the changes occurring in the audit system since the first half of 1980s onwards 
were more ephemeral than real, structural rather than in-depth.  In other words, pressure for 
change was related directly to the creation of the modern audit infrastructure, and not to the 
need for its effective and appropriate administration in the Malaysian social environment.  This 
is perhaps understandable since very little actually changed in the manner that political and 
economic power were distributed among members of Malaysian society and in the context of 
the so-called change from a predominantly command-economic system in the 1970s to a more 
capital-market economic system in the late 1980s and beyond.
All in all, it appears that the process of auditing was affected by certain groups 
who possessed special interests. These parties had made it certain for audit to operate in 
congruence with their expectations and objectives.   If changes were to take place, they would 
be mobilised in the pursuit of their vested interests.  Armstrong (1985, 1987), Hopper et al. 
(1987), Lehman and Tinker (1987), Loft (1986), Miller and O'Leary (1987) to mention a few 
have stressed this very point. Notwithstanding their rhetoric, it may safely be said that they had 
      
23little interest in seeing changes in the status quo.  As Rohwer (1995, p. 281) in his acclaimed 
work on the rising of East Asian nations had noted, "... elites do not normally reform 
themselves or do things to threaten their own position".  
Overall, audit in Malaysia prior to the onset of the Asian Financial Crisis 1997-
98 was in an uncertain and unsatisfactory state – similar to those found in other Asian 
countries such as the Philippines (Dyball and Valcarcel, 1999) and Japan (Sakagami et al., 
1999). It was clearly influenced by the broader context in which it was embedded.  It was the 
result of historical events which, on the face of vested interests and distinctive social, 
economic and political attributes, had failed to ensure that its existence in recent years would 
really make a huge difference to the pre-existing arrangement which emerged in the early 
1970s with the launching of the NEP. 
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31Contact author : Azham Md. Ali, Faculty of Accountancy, Universiti Utara Malaysia, azham@uum.edu.my
2See remarks made by the then chairman of the Securities Commission (SC) (The Malaysian Accountant, Oct/Dec 1993, p. 15), 
the Finance Minister (Akauntan Nasional, Sept. 1989, pp. 21-23; Aug. 1990, p. 26; Oct. 1990, pp. 20-21) and those by Tun 
Ismail Ali, the former Governor of Central Bank and the chairman of the Bumiputra trust agency, Permodalan Nasional Berhad 
(PNB), and several listed companies (The Malaysian Accountant, July-Sept 1988, p. 18). 
3Just before the Companies Act 1965 came into force, in 1965, the audit firm Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. located in Kuala 
Lumpur was sued by plaintiffs who were shareholders of a company  - Kiwi Dry Cleaners Ltd. - at the High Court of Malaya 
(Civil Suit No. 324 of 1965 Kuala Lumpur).  See (1967) 1 MLJ 87. (MLJ stands for Malayan Law Journal.)
4From hereon it is referred to as NST.    
5For example, as noted Malaysian Medical Council chairman Professor Datuk Dr Mahmood Mohd Noor, "[t]he number of 
medical negligence or malpractice suits in Malaysia is relatively few but the cases filed over the last two years were more than 
the average for the previous five years" (NST, 29 Dec. 1994).  As a result, it is reported that the Law Ministry is now looking into 
ways to introduce limits on the amount of money a plaintiff can claim (NST, 29 Dec. 1993).
6This view of his was however different to that of the former, for Oh Chong Peng (1989) did say that some amount of pressure for 
change had been dispensed by regulatory authorities like the Capital Issues Committee (which was replaced by the Securities 
Commission in 1992) and the Central Bank.
7Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu was criticised by a Hong Kong inspector over audits it conducted for a group of companies which 
were under criminal investigation (International Accounting Bulletin, 8 Nov 1993, p. 1).   The firm was alleged to have 
committed audit failure leading to the publication of misleading financial statements. In Singapore, the collapse of Pan-El, a 
property, salvage and hotel group, resulted in an unprecedented three-day closure of the Kuala Lumpur and Singapore stock 
exchanges in December 1985, the demise of six broking firms and the trial of three key figures in the Pan-El Group on charges 
ranging from criminal breach of trust to share forgery (NST, 6 June 1988).  The uproar over the alleged failure of the auditors to 
conduct proper audits was brought to public attention in late 1986 when the Singapore Minister of Finance mentioned in his 
speech in Parliament that there was "an inexplicable audit failure" in the Pan-El affair. The following year, the investigation 
undertaken by the Singapore Society of Accountants (SSA) culminated with Coopers & Lybrand publicly reprimanded for the 
quality of its audit work.  As for South Korea, in 1993, the country's Securities Supervisory Board (SSB), which regulates the 
nation's audit practice, issued warnings to seven of South Korea's audit firms for their alleged audit negligence (International 
Accounting Bulletin, 17 Jan. 1994, p. 4). This warning took place after SSB conducted a quality review of auditing practice of 
selected firms.  Out of the seven firms warned, four were affiliates of the Big Six (now Big Four).  Finally, in the case of India, as 
a result of the loss of US$1.5 billion through a securities fraud involving banks and mutual funds, the auditors were criticised by 
a Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) set up by the Parliament to investigate the case (International Accounting Bulletin, 14 
March 1994, p. 3). Not surprisingly, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) in 1993 dropped from its list of auditors for 1992/3 about 
20 audit firms which acted as auditors for the institutions involved during the 1991/2 fiscal year (International Accounting 
Bulletin, 21 June 1993, p. 2).  These firms which included all the Big Six were ordered to take a one year  "period of rest". 
8For South Korea, in December 1991, alleged failure of the auditors to uncover significant liabilities of now bankrupt companies 
had led to the investors filing the first ever lawsuit against the auditors (International Accounting Bulletin, Feb. 1992, p. 3). As 
for Singapore, in 1988, the former shareholders of Pan-El sued its group auditor, Coopers & Lybrand, for US$105 million (NST, 
6 June 1988). It perhaps needs to be noted too that early on in December 1987, a former partner of another accounting firm, 
acting as auditor for a number of Pan-El's subsidiaries, pleaded guilty to a criminal charge brought against him for issuing a 
misleading audit report.  He was sentenced to two months in jail and fined for S$10,000. 
9Note that Dahl (1967) defines power and conflict as the ability to impose one's will upon another and the existence of more than 
one interest, respectively.
10Dye (1986) argues that a cohesive "power elite" exercise authority over a variety of institutions.  This elite is comprised of a 
small group of dominant, authoritative individuals or entities.  The elite functions through, among other things, interlocking 
directorships, interlocking institutional experiences and similar social backgrounds.  However, instead of a single power elite, 
Dye says that a society may have different groups of individuals or entities which exercise power in its various sectors. Thus, 
leadership or authority is dispersed.  More importantly perhaps it is not unusual for these elites to be in conflict with each other.
11Previously in the Federation of Malaya, company law was governed by the Companies Ordinance 1946, whilst in the State of 
Singapore, it was governed by the Straits Settlements Ordinance 1940. The Sarawak Companies Ordinance was similar to the 
North Borneo Companies Ordinance, which was based on Hong Kong companies legislation which in turn was modelled from 
the English Companies Act of 1929.
12Note however that in the Parliamentary Debates  (Vol. II, no. 8, Col. 1558 and dated 9 Aug. 1965), it  was stated by the then 
Minister of Commerce and Industry, Dr. Lim Swee Aun, that the committee with the responsibility to draft the Companies Bill 
(whose chairman came from the ministry of commerce and industry and with the assistance of John Finemore, a Colombo Plan 
draftsman from Australia) had considered not only the present legislation in force in the UK, Australia, India and New Zealand 
but also the draft code prepared for Ghana by Professor Gower and the reports presented in the UK by the committees chaired by 
Lord Cohen and Lord Jenkin.
13The MIA president mentioned in 1987 that the power to issue audit and liquidator licenses had been delegated in accordance 
with Section 8(7) of the Companies Act 1965, to a committee in the finance ministry (The Malaysian Accountant, Oct-Dec 1987, 
p. 10).  He did not say however when this committee had actually started its operation. 
14The public and registered members are those with accounting bachelor or post-graduate diploma degrees from local higher 
institutions or accounting professional qualifications from MIA's recognised local and overseas accounting bodies.  To become a 
member, he or she also needed to have three to five years relevant experience in public accounting firms for public accountants 
and in commerce/industry/public sector entity for registered accountants.
 (Five years are the rule.  But it will be shortened to four years for those with High School Certificate and to three years for those graduating with degrees or diploma from local higher 
institutions.) The recognised accounting bodies (as listed in the Accountants Act’s First Schedule) are the Chartered Institutes of 
Scotland, England and Wales, Ireland, Australia, Canada and India; the Societies of Accountants of Australia and New Zealand; 
the Association of Certified Accountants (UK); the Institute of Cost and Management Accountants (UK); and Malaysian 
Association of Certified Public Accountants (MACPA).  As for the licensed accountants, they do not have MIA recognised 
accounting qualifications but are allowed to practice for either one of the following two reasons: they are already in operation as 
accountants, tax-consultants or tax advisers prior to the passing of the Accountants Act in 1967; the finance minister has granted 
them limited approval to act as company auditor under Section 8(6) of the Companies Act 1965.
15The Act however with regard to a tax consultant or a tax adviser has a provision allowing him or her to practice or hold 
him/herself out as one when he or she has the authority to do so as granted by any other law that is enforced within the country.
16As defined by Peng (1979, p. 193) to be the ratio between net fixed investment and net profits.
17The unofficial estimate of the total dead however was as high as six or seven hundred. The riots took place in the aftermath of 
the May 1969 general election when the Chinese-dominated opposition parties registered impressive gains at the polls.  They 
celebrated   their   victory   by   taunting   the   Malays   on   Malay   areas   of   Kuala   Lumpur.   The   Malays   in   turn   organised 
counterdemonstrations which moved into Chinese quarters. With insults exchanged on the streets, rioting ensued (see Bass, 1973; 
Parker, 1973; Chee, 1971; Teik, 1971; and National Operations Council, 1969). 
18He was among the first few Bumiputra sent to Australia under the Colombo Plan to study Accounting (Business Times, 17 Aug. 
1989). He qualified as a Chartered Accountant in 1960 after five years with Price Waterhouse in Melbourne.   Upon his 
retirement in 1989, he took over the business of the audit firm Baharom-Jasani (Business Times, 17 Aug. 1989).  In 1991, it was 
reported (The Star, 10 July 1991) that Shamsir Jasani & Co, the seventh largest accounting firm in the country, had 130 staff and 
was backed by Grant Thornton International.
19From both the documented sources and interviews, a variety of answers is found as to why the MIA limited itself to play a 
“registering role” for two decades (see Azham, 2002).
20Note that this remark was probably made in response to the criticism made by the then Central Bank's Governor, Tan Sri Jaafar 
Hussein, towards the MACPA leadership (see The Malaysian Accountant, July 1986, p. 6).  Note also that an interviewee who 
had been involved with the MACPA investigation committee for several years mentioned that the MACPA could be stricter in 
punishing errant members.  
21 It is notable that the 1981, 1982 and 1984 Annual Reports of MACPA mentioned the various efforts conducted by the MACPA 
in confronting the issue of unregistered accountants.  The MACPA 1984 Annual Report for example, mentioned that the MACPA 
had sent a memorandum to the Accountant-General who was the MIA president.  Next it stated (p. 22): "We now await his action 
against persons identified in our memorandum as violating the provisions of the Accountants Act 1967."  Apparently, he did not 
do anything that could make a difference.  This should not perhaps be surprising due to the fact that these accountants were 
needed in the then fast growing economy which was facing severe shortage of qualified accountants (see Committee on 
International Accounting Operation and Education, 1976-78, of the American Accounting Association, 1978, p. 39; Ahmad-
Noordin, 1981, p. 25). 
22 Perhaps nothing else could describe the appalling state of audit during this period than the case of Bank 
Rakyat which was illustrated  in a 1979 Parliamentary White Paper. In summary, Bank Rakyat was established in 1950.  By 
1975, it had expanded its paid up capita to over RM 15 million and membership comprised of over twenty three thousands 
individuals and just over 1000 cooperative societies. It faced acute financial problems from 1973 which resulted in it being 
rescued by the government in 1977.  The parliamentary paper revealed widespread corrupt activities by parties inside the bank 
and those related to it, including the external auditor, the audit firm Kassim Chan & Co.  And yet the auditor appeared to have 
escaped without censure or penalty.  An opposition MP Lim Kit Siang in a  speech in the Parliament in June 1979 argued (Siang, 
1982, p. 266): "In other countries, such negligence and conflict of interest could have resulted in professional action being taken 
against the firms of auditors, and I want to know what action  the Government has taken against Kassim Chan & Co. for its 
professional negligence and conflict of interest, leading to such colossal losses".  He also claimed (p. 265) that the role played 
by the auditor in the "Great Bank Rakyat Betrayal" was one of the "sorriest episodes" of all.
From an interview conducted with one of the leaders of the MACPA, it was found that except for the MACPA 
which suspended the membership of the audit partner in charge for “three months”, it appeared that (as far as he knew it) the 
government authorities in the form of for example, the Attorney General or the police had taken no action against the auditor as a 
consequence. Even the Ministry of Finance had failed to withdraw his audit licence.  As for the MIA that did not even have the 
right machinery in place in the form of investigative and disciplinary committees, there was nothing to be expected of it. In fact, 
in the MIA 1967-1987 Annual Report, this very auditor had been listed as an MIA council member since 1972. In other words, 
when the Bank Rakyat case became public and he was named in the Parliamentary White Paper for failing to do a proper audit 
and lacking independence,  not only did he not face any  sanctions from the MIA, but he also continued to act as a council 
member of the MIA, as if nothing had happened!
23That of the equity requirements on investment in most business enterprises: 30 percent equity in a business enterprise for 
Bumiputra, 40 percent for other Malaysians and 30 percent foreigners.24In terms of the number of companies listed, the increase was from 321 listed in 1992 to over 500 companies by the end of 1995. 
At the end of 1993, the market value of the KLSE had also jumped to RM 620 billion - an increase of 152 percent from the RM 
246 billion recorded at the end of the previous year (NST, 14 May 1994). In 1993 too, the total volume and turnover rose to 108 
billion units valued at RM 387 billion, which exceeded the combined volume and turnover for the past 20 years! In 1994, the 
International Finance Corporation, an affiliate of the World Bank, posted in the Internet that the KLSE's market capitalisation as 
at November 1993 was US$175 billions - the second biggest after Hong Kong among 22 emerging markets capitalisation. It is 
perhaps important to note that paralleling these numerical advances, the government during the same period had embarked on a 
number of steps related to the nation’s securities market – a continuation of those taken in the last half of 1980s.  These included 
requiring the formation of audit committee for listed companies (Akauntan Nasional, Nov/Dec. 1993, p. 26), the setting up 
Securities Commission (SC) (Yusof, 1993; Mohd.-Salleh, 1993), both in 1993, and the upgrading of penalties for any breach of 
the KLSE listing requirements from public reprimands and suspension of trading to fines of up to RM 100,000 (NST, 30 Sept. 
1994) in the following year. Finally, in 1995, the government unveiled an 18-point liberalising package for the capital market 
with local and international objectives. 
25The merger proposal was rejected on 17 June, 1985.  Reason given was that there was no need for the merged body (the MICA) 
as there was already  an accounting body in the country entrusted with all the required tasks to spearhead the accounting 
profession in the form of the MIA (MIA Annual Report, 1967-87, p. 11).  The interviews had however found that there was no 
"outright" rejection by the government. See Azham (2002).
26In other words, the MIA was supposed to be a full-fledged accounting professional body. In the following year however, in 
Parliament, at a time when the media was having a field day reporting on the public quarrels between the leaders of the MIA and 
the MACPA (see Azham, 2002), his deputy made remarks which were not encouraging at all to those in the MIA. He said that the 
MIA should continue to oversee the MACPA and other professional accounting bodies (The Star, 12 Oct. 1988; Business Times, 
12 Oct. 1988). Both bodies he claimed had different functions and responsibilities. He also said that through the Accountants Act 
1967, the MIA was set up to monitor, regulate and coordinate the accounting profession for the purpose of safeguarding public 
interest and ensuring high professional standards. The MIA in short was to act as mere supervisory and coordinating body for the 
rest of accounting professional bodies in the country.  
27The apparent exceptions took place in two cases: one in 1992 when the MIA president was reported to have said that the MIA 
had found from its recent investigation involving 40 accountants that there were auditors who had failed to issue proper audit 
report (NST, 12 Apr. 1992).  The other was in 1993 under the headline "MIA Warning to Errant Members" (NST, 28 Jan. 1993). 
However on closer inspection, the story involved members of MIA who colluded with unqualified accountants.  Thus, this story 
was nothing new.  It is because on this very subject of collusion between members and the so-called unqualified accountants, the 
MIA over the years was fond of issuing numerous statements to the media making one warning after another that stern action 
would be taken against its members with really no news as to whether  the actions in fact, had been taken.  See The Malay Mail 
(4 Feb. 1988; 26 Feb. 1992) and NST (17 Sept. 1988; 31 Jan. 1991).
28The MIA in contrast to  the MACPA did not divulge the types of disciplinary action taken against the members in its annual 
reports.  Why it did not find fit to clearly spell what these actions were appears to be one of those questions whose answers are 
anyone's guess.
29The excuse for no disciplinary actions taken in 1989 was this as appeared in the MIA 1989 Annual Report (p. 13): Dato' 
Shamsir Omar who was sitting in the disciplinary committee left the council (and thus the committee too) due to his retirement 
from his position as the then Accountant-General.  As for the year 1990, the excuse as found in the MIA 1990 Annual Report (p. 
13) was this: shortage of manpower "especially" with the resignation of the Institute's legal officer.
30 Remarks made by the newly appointed finance minster (Akauntan Nasional, Sept/Oct 1991, p. 23; The Malaysian Accountant, 
June 1992, p. 18) and  the MIA itself (ASEAN Accounting Research Unit, 1992, p. 75; MIA 1992 Annual Report, p.16) 
provided evidence of the fact that the country was facing a shortage problem of qualified accountants/auditors.  In the NST (12 
Apr. 1991), the following was also stated: "A Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA) document says the shortage of auditors 
and tax consultants is very acute.  While there are over 172,000 companies registered with the Registrar of Companies, there are 
only about 600 approved company auditors." But the MIA from the time when it was activated had kept on shifting the date as to 
when it would start organising the professional examinations!
w
 And when the examination was finally set up in 1996, the MIA did 
not  provide a real alternative or an actual additional avenue for locals wishing to qualify as accountants because it was a 
combined effort of both the MIA and the CACA (Akauntan Nasional, Oct. 1995, p. 4). The collaborative exam structure was 
exactly the same as the UK based qualification which had been offered in the country for decades.  The difference between the 
two examinations was that students now had the option of sitting for the UK or Malaysian law variant papers.
31Note that Chandra Muzaffar and Aliran appear to be well versed in this subject matter.  Check for example Aliran (1981a, 
Chapter Three), Aliran (1981b), Aliran (1988a, Chapter Four) and Chandra (1989, pp. 47-56).  For more on the same subject, 
please check also the following: The speeches made by Lim Kit Siang on 25 October 1977, 27 October 1975 and 14 July 1971 
which appear in Siang (1978); the section entitled "On a Clean, Efficient and Democratic Government" in Siang (1986); and 
finally Schlossstein (1991, Chapter Four).
32 This could be because of the fact that by the late 1980s and early 1990s, even after a significant proportion of 
the economy had been transferred - under the so-called privatisation exercise - from the government to the private sector resulting 
to what was proclaimed to be a strong accounting profession, what appears to be the case was that much of the private sector was 
still in the hands of those associated closely with the government sector (see Gomez, 1997; Jomo, 1995). This section of the 
private sector may even be considered as an "extension" of the government sector where reigning politicians and their political 
parties had for years been deeply involved in the business sector (see Gomez, 1994, 1990; Leigh, 1992; Leong, 1988, Chapter Six; and Gale, 1985). There was merely a superficial rearrangement of wealth and thus power among the few in the society.  It is 
also notable that when it concerned the listing of a number of privatised entities at the KLSE, the percentage of shares offered for 
sale did not exceed thirty percent of the total shares (Mohd.-Sheriff, 1992): MAS, 30 percent; MISC, 17 percent; STM, 23.9 
percent; and TNB, 22.8 percent. As a result,  partial divestment of equity of government-owned entities provided a means 
whereby, the government was still in the case of these companies, their major shareholder. 
This very fact is not surprising since the local corporate scene was filled with individuals or companies owning 
at least 51 percent of the shares of the so-called public companies including those listed on the KLSE.  So, even in the 1990s 
when the NEP era was supposed to have come to an end, the NST (30 May 1994) reported that more than two-thirds of the 335 
companies on the main board and all of the 92 on the second board were controlled either by one or a few shareholders with more 
than 51 percent of the shares. This domination was not illegal since the KLSE listing rules required no more than a public float of 
25 percent of the total shares issued. As a result, the listed companies still remained  private companies (Mohd.-Salleh, 1989). 
They were public and listed only in names. Many of the listed companies were labelled by chairman of the Malaysian Institute of 
Economic Research (MIER), Datuk Dr. Kamal Salih, as "private-owned public company" (NST, 21 August 1991). Most shares 
were still held by insiders - family members, friends, clan members and others known personally to the companies' founders. And 
when it concerned  privatised entities including those listed on the KLSE, the shareholders were other government entities.  
Therefore, on the whole, the "principal-agent" dichotomy did not exist or was at best blurred in the Malaysian context. 
Even though more and more companies were formed from the 1970s onwards,
E
 many of these were "companies" merely in name - 
leading to various distressful conducts perpetrated by majority shareholders who also managed their daily affairs.  The unsavoury 
acts of these companies included the tendency to flout the law (Ram, 1985; Azham, 2002) and the reluctance to disclose much 
(Tong et al., 1989; Tong and Ann, 1996; Tay, 1994; Jaafar, 1992).  Thus, the need for a truly functional audit was still not as 
acute as would have been expected if indeed a new  political economic context had emerged after the two recessions in the 1980s. 
In fact, it appears that a weak audit profession that devoted more attention to promotional aspects than regulation suited certain 
parties, notwithstanding the rhetoric by a few among the power elite stressing from time to time the need for improvements in 
practice, stricter enforcement of rules and regulations, etc.  
33  Perhaps a good case in point is the "BMF Affair" that took place in the first half of 1980s that led to 
the loss of around US$1 billion and the death of the (internal) auditor who investigated the case.  Koon (1994) in her study of 
the BMF Affair pointed out what the government appeared to have done "to prevent" its public disclosure. On pages 194-95 of 
her thesis, she listed down the "systematic cover-up of the case from the Malaysian public" ranging from the denial made by the 
BBMB of the extent of its subsidiary’s (BMF) involvement in the Carrian Group in September 1982 to the creation of a limited 
Committee of Inquiry by the government after rejecting public demand for a Royal Commission in January 1984 and finally to 
the government’s reluctance to publish the report of the Committee of Inquiry in 1986.   Later, due to public's demand for 
publication, only 2,000 copies were published at the price of RM 250 which was beyond the reach of average Malaysians! 
 With all this in the background, it is perhaps not surprising to find that HRM as the auditor of the parent body 
BBMB was “quietly” replaced soon after by another auditor. This apparently was the worst that could happen to an auditor 
whose audit opinion in its audit reports was the opposite of the stance taken by the Committee of Inquiry which disclosed that 
both audited financial statements of BMF and BBMB did not give a true and fair view of the state of affairs of BBMB and the 
Group as at 31 December 1981 (Siang, 1986, p. 36).
This revelation of what took place in the “private sector” may be added to those that came straight from those 
in the know in the arena of government operation where the leaders had repeatedly proclaimed the need for clean government and 
stiff actions against corrupt acts.   The then deputy accountant-general (Akauntan Nasional, Jan. 1990, p. 19),  noted that the 
government’s reaction had been indifferent towards accounting as a tool for effectiveness and efficiency. And from the former 
auditor-general, Tan Sri Ahmad Noordin, the following was his remark when he was discussing value for money audits in 
government operations (Ahmad-Noordin, 1986, p. 47):
We have accordingly amended or rather we had the Audit Act amended to ensure that the Auditor-General has the 
necessary power within the law to carry out this value for money audit as I mentioned just now.  What seemed to be the 
constraint when I was there was that as value for money or performance audit penetrates into the activities of governments, 
there was a natural tendency for  authorities having the power to approve  staff for the Audit Office to make it difficult for the 
Audit Office to get the necessary skills and manpower to carry out this work.
Thus, it may safely be said that the debilitating atmosphere in the audit arena in the post-NEP era had been deliberate 
and intended to deflect attention from creating a "culture of accountability" or full public disclosure, because interested parties 
did not want to face the unnecessary "complication" of explaining themselves to anyone in their pursuit of gaining economic 
ascendancy.  This is  stated by Belkaoui (1974, as reported by Samuels and Piper, 1985, p. 141): a class elite in many developing 
countries are interested in maintaining secrecy, thus, the financial reporting system was purposely made to be weak so that it was 
easy for this elite to maintain secrecy for their own gain.
34Perhaps it was because at that time Malaysia was getting bogged down by the Asian Financial Crisis? So, there was no need for 
additional bad news that could only make the economy worse off? It perhaps needs to be noted that on the eve of the Asian Financial Crisis, just a few months after the operation had begun, the NST  (8 July 1997) did file a report on remarks coming from 
the domestic trade and consumer affairs minister that there were five cases of auditors obstructing the ROC officers in conducting 
their inspection which to that date numbered to 123 audit firms.  He also mentioned that the southern branch of the MIA had sent 
out circulars asking its members not to co-operate with the ROC should their firms be called for inspection.  He therefore 
warned/advised the auditors to co-operate with the ROC or face legal action.